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Abstract The Gibbard–Satterthwaite (1973/75) theorem roughly states that we have to
accept dictatorship or manipulability in case of at least three alternatives. A large strand of
the literature estimates the degree of manipulability of social choice functions (e.g. Aleskerov
and Kurbanov, 1999, Favardin et al., 2002, and Aleskerov et al., 2012), most of them em-
ploying the Nitzan-Kelly index of manipulability. We take a different approach and introduce
a non-dictatorship index based on our recent work (Bednay et al., 2017), where we have anal-
ysed social choice functions based on their distances to the dictatorial rules. By employing
computer simulations, we investigate the relationship between the manipulability and non-
dictatorship indices of some prominent social choice functions, putting them into a common
framework.
Keywords: Voting rules, dictatorship, manipulability, manipulability index, dictatorship
index.
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1 Introduction
The classic result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that for at least three
alternatives every universal and resolute social choice function is either manipulable or
dictatorial. There is a large literature on how to escape from the negative implications
of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem by restricting the set of possible preference profiles,
most of them related to single-peaked preferences and their generalizations (e.g. Black,
1958; Moulin, 1980; Barbera et al., 1993; and Puppe and Nehring, 2007a and 2007b, just
to name a few). Since the normative approach does not give us the ultimate answer for
choosing between social choice functions, another strand of the literature tries to estimate
to what extent different voting rules are susceptible to manipulation and to compare the
common voting rules according to their ‘degree of manipulability’.
There is no universally accepted way to measure the degree of manipulability, but one
of the most common approaches is to consider the ratio of preference profiles where manip-
ulation is possible to the total number of profiles, which is called the Nitzan-Kelly’s index
(NKI, hereinafter) of manipulability, since it was first introduced in Nitzan (1985) and Kelly
(1988).1 A voting rule is thought to be less manipulable if it is manipulable at fewer pref-
1For other indices of manipulability, see Smith (1999).
erence profiles, or equivalently, if it has a smaller NKI (clearly, the dictatorial voting rule is
the least manipulable one). There are a number of studies investigating voting rules under
this approach. Kelly (1988) found the minimal number of manipulable profiles for social
choice rules which are unanimous and non-dictatorial. This research direction is continued
in Fristrup and Keiding (1988) and a series of studies in Maus et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2007c,
2007d).
Kelly (1993) compares the manipulability of the Borda rule with the manipulability of
different classes of social choice procedures by developing computational results. Aleskerov
and Kurbanov (1999) continue this line of research. The authors study the degree of manip-
ulability of several social choice rules via computational experiments, considering the NKI
and in addition introducing some new indices, which are further elaborated in Aleskerov et
al. (2009, 2011, 2012). Peters et al. (2012) study both theoretically and using simulations
the manipulability of approval voting rule and a family of k-approval rules.
In this paper we follow a different route and formulate indices in relation to the dictatorial
voting rule, thus picking dictatorship as a reference point instead of manipulability, when
looking at the two incompatible properties appearing in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
In Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasna´di (2017) we have derived the plurality rule as the most
balanced one in the sense that it minimizes the sum of the distances to all dictatorial rules,
and we have obtained the reverse-plurality rule by maximizing the distance to the closest
dictatorial rule. Based on this approach we introduce the non-dictatorship index (NDI).
When employing manipulability indices on the set of commonly used social choice functions,
the literature strives for the rules with the lowest manipulability index by assuming that a
relatively less manipulable rule is deemed to be more desirable. In an analogous way, we are
looking for the social choice function with the highest NDI, i.e., the social choice function
with low degree of dictatorship.
Our research is also motivated by the fact that regarding manipulability and non-
dictatorship there is a kind of weak agreement on the ‘most extreme’ social choice functions.
In particular, the reverse-plurality rule, which is the most extreme social choice function
in the sense that it lies the furthest away from the closest dictatorial rule, is also group
manipulable at every preference profile. Moreover, the reverse-dictatorial social choice func-
tion, which always chooses the worst alternative of a fixed voter, is individually manipulable
at each profile. Trivially, any dictatorial voting rule is non-manipulable at any preference
profile.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between NDIs and NKIs and
to put them into a common framework. By employing computer simulations, we estimate
the NDIs of some well-known social choice functions (some scoring rules and Condorcet
consistent rules). We calculate NDIs for 3, 4 and 5 alternatives and up to 100 voters by
generating 1000 random preference profiles, where each profile is selected with the same
probability, i.e. we assume an impartial culture. We find that among the prominent social
choice functions the plurality rule has the smallest NDI, the Borda count, the Black rule
and the Copeland method follow with approximately identical NDIs, while k-approval voting
(for k = 2 or k = 3) has the highest NDI among the most common social choice functions.
In measuring manipulability we restrict ourselves to NKI, which measures the strategy-
proofness by counting the number of profiles on which a social choice function is manipulable.
While for determining the values for NDI we have written our own program, for determining
NKI we have downloaded the results available at Aleskerov et al. (2013),2 where we employ
the alphabetical tie-breaking rule. Thereafter, we compare our results with Aleskerov et al
(2011).
We find that, when unifying the NDIs and NKIs for our social choice functions under
2http://manip.hse.ru/index.html
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study, both indices move in the opposite directions, which is a plausible sign for our non-
dictatorship index. Next we look at both NDI and NKI of the social choice functions. From
our findings we would like to highlight that basically the plurality rule performs the worst
in terms of both NDI and NKI with the exception of the case of 4 alternatives for which the
3-approval voting rule has an even higher NKI. However, there is no such analogously best
performing rule based on the two indices.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic notations and the
indices to measure the degree of dictatorship of social choice functions. Section 3 presents
the social choice rules under study. Section 4 explains the computational scheme, presents
and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The framework
Let A = {1, . . . ,m} be the set of alternatives, where m ≥ 2, and N = {1, . . . , n} be the
set of voters. We shall denote by P the set of all linear orderings (irreflexive, transitive
and total binary relations) on A and by Pn the set of all preference profiles. If ∈ Pn and
i ∈ N , then i is the preference ordering of voter i over A.
Definition 1. A mapping f : Pn → A that selects the winning alternative is called a social
choice function, henceforth, SCF.
As our definition of an SCF does not allow for possible ties, in this event a fixed (anony-
mous) tie-breaking rule will be employed. A tie-breaking rule τ : Pn → P maps preference
profiles to linear orderings on A, which will be only employed when a formula does not deter-
mine a unique winner. If there are more alternatives chosen by a formula ‘almost’ specifying
an SCF, then the highest ranked alternative is selected, based on the given tie-breaking rule
among tied alternatives. When determining the NKIs for the voting rules under study, we
employ the lexicographic tie-breaking rule 1  2  · · ·  m, which is anonymous and does
not depend on the actual preference profile ∈ Pn.
Let F = APn be the set of SCFs and Fan ⊂ F be the set of anonymous voting rules.
The subset of F consisting of the dictatorial rules will be denoted by D = {d1, . . . , dn},
where di is the dictatorial rule with voter i as the dictator. By counting the number of
profiles, on which f and g choose different alternatives we define a metric:
ρ(f, g) = #{∈ Pn|f() 6= g()} (2.1)
on F = APn .
We define our non-dictatorship index (NDI) by taking the distance to the closest dictator.




We specify the set of least dictatorial rules by those ones which are the furthest away
from the closest dictatorial rule, which means that we are maximizing the minimum of the
distances to the dictators.
Definition 3. We define the set of least dictatorial rules by




ρ(f, di) = arg max
f∈F
NDI(f)
in general and by








over the set of anonymous voting rules.
In Bednay, Moskalenko and Tasna´di (2017) we have established that Fanld equals the
set of reverse-plurality rules with anonymous tie-breaking rules, where the reverse-plurality
rule f∗τ selects the alternative being the fewest times on the top and in case of ties, a fixed
anonymous tie-breaking rule τ is employed.
3 Voting rules
We will need some additional notations. Let q be the cardinality of A and let s : {1, ..., q} →
R satisfy s(1) ≥ s(2) ≥ ... ≥ s(q) and s(1) > s(q). Moreover, let rk[a,] denote the rank of
alternative a in the ordering ∈ P (i.e. rk[a,] = 1 if a is the top alternative in the ranking
, rk[a,] = 2 if a is second-best, and so on). We consider the following five common
voting rules.
1. Plurality Rule: A voting rule PL is the plurality rule if for all (i)ni=1 ∈ Pn
PL ((i)ni=1) = arg max
a∈A
# {i ∈ N | rk[a,i] = 1} .
PL choose the alternatives that are ranked first by the maximum number of voters.
2. Borda Count: We shall denote the Borda score of alternative a ∈ A according to
ordering  by bs [a,] = q − rk[a,]. A voting rule BC is the Borda count if for all
(i)ni=1 ∈ Pn





BC choose the alternatives with the maximum Borda score bs.
3. k-Approval Rule: A voting rule k−AV is the k-approval voting rule if for all (i)ni=1 ∈
Pn
k−AV ((i)ni=1) = arg max
a∈A
# {i ∈ N | rk[a,i] ≤ k} .
k − AV chooses the alternatives which are admitted to be among the k best by the
highest number of voters. We will consider k −AV for k = 2, 3.
4. Copeland Method: For a given profile (i)ni=1 ∈ Pn we say that alternative a ∈ A
beats alternative x ∈ A if #{i ∈ N | a i x} > #{i ∈ N | x i a}, i.e. a wins over x
by pairwise comparison. We shall denote by l[a, (i)ni=1] the number of alternatives beaten
by alternative a ∈ A for a given profile (i)ni=1. Then a voting rule CM is the Copeland
method if for all (i)ni=1 ∈ Pn
CM ((i)ni=1) = arg max
a∈A
l[a, (i)ni=1].
5. Black’s procedure: Let µ be a majority relation for a given profile (i)ni=1 ∈ Pn,
then aµx if #{i ∈ N | a i x} > #{i ∈ N | x i a}. The Condorcet winner CW in a
profile (i)ni=1 is an element beating any other alternative based on the majority relation µ
(constructed according to the profile), i.e.
CW ((i)ni=1) = {a ∈ A | for all x ∈ A \ {a} : aµx} .
Black’s rule chooses the Condorcet winner if it exists, otherwise it chooses the alternative
with the highest Borda score.
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4 Computation scheme and results
The calculation of indices is performed for 3, 4 and 5 alternatives and up to 100 voters. We
generate 1000 random preference profiles, where each profile occurs with equal probability,
i.e. under the Impartial Culture assumption.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the results of the NDIs of the voting rules for the case of 3,
4 and 5 alternatives and for 3, 4, 5, 20 and 100 voters. We look at the non-dictatorship
property of the 6 voting rules, taking into account the reverse-plurality rule, which serves
as a benchmark (clearly, it has the highest NDI). It can be readily seen that among the
common voting rules the plurality rule performs the worst, having the lowest NDI. The k
- approval voting (k = 3 or k = 2) performs the best, with the highest NDI. The Borda
count, Black’s rule and the Copeland method lie between the plurality and the k-approval
rules without any clear difference between them.
Voting rules
Number of voters
3 4 5 10 20 100
Plurality 0.360 0.392 0.427 0.484 0.533 0.583
Borda 0.363 0.442 0.450 0.486 0.527 0.587
k-Approval k = 2 0.488 0.550 0.544 0.571 0.570 0.605
k-Approval k = 3 0.642 0.661 0.656 0.648 0.644 0.627
Copeland 0.348 0.438 0.439 0.491 0.527 0.581
Black 0.348 0.442 0.436 0.486 0.519 0.585
Reverse-plurality 0.918 0.881 0.867 0.797 0.746 0.682
Table 1: Non-dictatorship indices in case of three alternatives
Voting rules
Number of voters
3 4 5 10 20 100
Plurality 0.437 0.448 0.485 0.548 0.602 0.655
Borda 0.455 0.501 0.531 0.575 0.628 0.677
k-Approval k = 2 0.591 0.580 0.613 0.629 0.649 0.688
k-Approval k = 3 0.617 0.662 0.669 0.695 0.685 0.701
Copeland 0.437 0.493 0.506 0.565 0.629 0.673
Black 0.435 0.499 0.510 0.571 0.628 0.676
Reverse-plurality 1 0.969 0.950 0.882 0.842 0.770
Table 2: Non-dictatorship indices in case of four alternatives
Voting rules
Number of voters
3 4 5 15 20 100
Plurality 0.449 0.497 0.524 0.618 0.651 0.706
Borda 0.517 0.556 0.581 0.673 0.685 0.735
k-Approval k = 2 0.601 0.623 0.641 0.699 0.705 0.725
k-Approval k = 3 0.676 0.692 0.704 0.733 0.716 0.744
Copeland 0.465 0.552 0.567 0.660 0.684 0.727
Black 0.473 0.554 0.572 0.662 0.684 0.734
Reverse-plurality 1 1 0.991 0.906 0.898 0.824
Table 3: Non-dictatorship indices in case of five alternatives
The graphical representations of the NDIs for 3, 4 and 5 alternatives case and up to
100 voters are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3. On the X-axis we have the number of voters
and on the Y-axis we have the values of NDIs. From these figures we observe that the
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reverse-plurality rule has the highest NDI, while the plurality rule has the lowest NDI. The
NDIs of the other voting rules under study lie between the NDIs of these two rules.
Figure 1: Non-dictatorship indices in case of three alternatives
Figure 2: Non-dictatorship indices in case of four alternatives
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Figure 3: Non-dictatorship indices in case of five alternatives
If we also add the degree of manipulability, we expect that while the NDIs of common
voting rules are increasing, their NKIs are decreasing in the number of voters. To check
this, we put both the NDIs and NKIs in the same tables and figures. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show
the unified results for the NKIs and NDIs of the voting rules under study for the case of 3,
4 and 5 alternatives, and 3, 4 and 10 voters. High NDI means a low degree of dictatorship,
while low NKI means a low degree of manipulability. Thus, the voting rule which has high
NDI and low NKI will perform the best.
Voting rules
n = 3 n = 4 n = 10 n = 100
NDI NKI NDI NKI NDI NKI NDI NKI
Plurality 0.360 0.167 0.392 0.185 0.484 0.284 0.583 0.139
Borda 0.363 0.236 0.442 0.310 0.486 0.241 0.587 0.083
k-Approval k = 2 0.488 0.264 0.550 0.275 0.571 0.278 0.605 0.128
Copeland 0.348 0.111 0.438 0.296 0.491 0.194 0.581 0.056
Black 0.348 0.111 0.442 0.144 0.486 0.147 0.585 0.065
Table 4: NDIs and NKIs for the case of three alternatives
Voting rules
n = 3 n = 4 n = 10 n = 100
NDI NKI NDI NKI NDI NKI NDI NKI
Plurality 0.437 0.294 0.448 0.325 0.548 0.421 0.655 0.187
Borda 0.455 0.512 0.501 0.500 0.575 0.419 0.677 0.153
k-Approval k = 2 0.591 0.394 0.580 0.426 0.629 0.419 0.688 0.170
k-Approval k = 3 0.617 0.500 0.662 0.525 0.695 0.490 0.701 0.198
Copeland 0.437 0.227 0.493 0.453 0.565 0.343 0.673 0.135
Black 0.435 0.276 0.499 0.263 0.571 0.275 0.676 0.127
Table 5: NDIs and NKIs for the case of four alternatives
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Voting rules
n = 3 n = 4 n = 15 n = 100
NDI NKI NDI NKI NDI NKI NDI NKI
Plurality 0.449 0.389 0.497 0.426 0.618 0.469 0.706 0.227
Borda 0.517 0.691 0.556 0.639 0.673 0.465 0.735 0.206
k-Approval k = 2 0.517 0.691 0.556 0.639 0.673 0.465 0.735 0.206
k-Approval k = 3 0.676 0.576 0.692 0.582 0.733 0.464 0.744 0.201
Copeland 0.465 0.329 0.552 0.561 0.660 0.382 0.727 0.202
Black 0.473 0.409 0.554 0.357 0.662 0.419 0.734 0.182
Table 6: NDIs and NKIs for the case of five alternatives
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show graphically the results for both NDIs and NKIs. We can see that
both NDIs and NKIs are moving in the opposite directions, which is plausible and a positive
sign for our non-dictatorship index. In case of three alternatives (m = 3), the plurality rule
performs the worst from the point of view of both dictatorship and manipulability. However,
when there are four alternatives (m = 4), the rule that performs the worst from the point
of view of manipulability is the k-approval rule with k = 3, and the plurality rule performs
the worst from the point of view of dictatorship (has the lowest NDI), while the k-approval
rule with k = 3 has the highest NDI, but of course, without taking into account the reverse-
plurality rule’s NDI. Considering the case of five alternatives (m = 5), for a small number
of voters (n < 15), the Borda count has the highest degree of manipulability (NKI is high),
while from the point of view of dictatorship its NDI is identical to Black’s rule and lies
between the plurality and k-approval rule with k = 3. As the number of voters increases
(n ≥ 15), again the only voting rule that performs the worst from the point of view of both
manipulability and dictatorship is the plurality rule (with the exception of the 3-approval
voting rule, which, for the case of four alternatives, has a higher NKI).
Figure 4: Non-dictatorship and Nitzan-Kelly indices in case of 3 alternatives
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Figure 5: Non-dictatorship and Nitzan-Kelly indices in case of 3 alternatives
Figure 6: Non-dictatorship and Nitzan-Kelly indices in case of 3 alternatives
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5 Conclusion
Based on the classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem the properties of strategy-
proofness and non-dictatorship are incompatible if there are at least three alternatives, any
preference profile is possible and the social choice function has to be onto. Therefore, when-
ever a decision has to be made about the social choice function to be employed, we always
face the dilemma of choosing between a degree of dictatorship and a degree of manipulability.
Both incompatible properties are undesirable. However, when picking a voting rule it
could be helpful and informative to know about its degree of manipulability and its distance
from dictatorship. Concerning non-manipulability indices, we have selected the Nitzan-
Kelly index, which counts the number of manipulable profiles in the total number of profiles
from the several non-manipulability indices already employed in the literature. We have
introduced a non-dictatorship index, which measures the dictatorial component of voting
rules, and we have ranked common voting rules based on this index.
Clearly, we could think about different ways of measuring the dictatorial component of
a voting rule. We have chosen a fairly straightforward distance based approach for defining
our non-dictatorship index. In this paper we have explored the relationship between the
Nitzan-Kelly index and our non-dictatorship index. Though these two approaches differ sub-
stantially we nevertheless arrived to the same conclusion that among the prominent voting
rules basically the plurality rule performs the worst from the point of view of dictatorship
and manipulability.
Finally, we would like to mention that since by having less manipulable profiles we are
getting closer to the dictatorial rule it is not at all clear whether minimizing the number
of manipulable profiles should be the right goal. We have a similar situation in case of our
non-dictatorship index since by maximizing our non-dictatorship index we are getting closer
to the undesirable reverse-plurality rule. Despite challenging these approaches we believe
that they shed some light on the evergreen problem of choosing an appropriate voting rule.
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